Fracture Mechanics of Bonded Structures by Tupper, Nate
FRACTURE MECHANICS OF BONDED STRUCTURES 
Nate Tupper 
Air Force ~1aterials Laboratory 
Wright-Patterso~ Air Force Base 
Dayton, Ohio 
I want to talk a litt le bit this morning about the damage tolerance 
philosophy of the Air Force as applied to new systems. I'm going to talk 
particularly about metals and try to indicate those areas where the philo-
sophy that we're applying in our metal structure is equally applicable to 
both adhesive bonded joints and composite materia l s, the idea being that the 
techniques to satisfy the requirements will change and some of the require-
ments will change, but the phi losophy will be the same. The philosophy 
has to do with beginning to recognize, and I think we now all do, that 
structure that is manufactured, rolled out the door and put into service is 
defective at the time it rolls out the door. 
Now, we had a lot of trouble in accepting that idea; it reminds me 
of the story of the couple that got married, and on their wedding night t he 
husband was undressing, and he took his trousers off and gave them to his 
wife and said, ~Here, I want you to put these on." So, she pulled up the 
trousers and he said, "Now, let go of them", and she did, and, of course, 
they fell to the floor. Then he said, "Well, that just goes to show you 
who's going to wear the pants in the family. She loo ked at him, and as she 
was undressing she gave him her panties and she said, "I'd like you to put 
these on." He said, "I can't put these on. " She said, "I want you to try." 
So, he tried and tried and he got them up about to here, and that was all he 
cou ld do. He said, "Dear, I "m sorry, I can't get into your pants, " and she 
said, "Yeah, I know, and you won't until you change your attitude ." 
So, that's really what we're talking about, the changing of attitudes. 
The problem came from diff "culties that we've had with our Air Force airplanes. 
Simply, we've had problems with structural safety, we've had problems wi t h 
durability, that is, fatigue, and we've had to find some way to solve those 
problems, some way around them. 
We now recognize shortcomings in the methods that we have used in the 
past. The approach that we used prior to the '69-'70 time period assumes 
that, if you have a structure that's good, you have an operational life t hat 
you can project together wi th good economy, little repair, and that sort of 
thing. Early catastrophic failure that proceeds from the presence of an 
initial defect can completely negate your assumption and can negate your 
realiz~tion of those expectations. The second thing which seems kind of simple 
but quite true, has been quite a trauma to a lot of people. No matter how 
much reliance we place on i nservice inspection, those inspections will not 
protect you when you have uninspectab le structure . It simply requires that 
we make sure that, if we're relying on inspections, that the structure really 
is i nspectable and we're not fooling ourselves. 
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Finally, we found out that the safety-structural safety of monolithic 
structures is simply not protected by the method we had used, that is, the 
full scale fatigue test divided by a factor of four together with the state-
ment that that's our life. A simple example shows why that's true. If you 
have a test article, a full scale airplane, for example, and you put it on 
test and it happens to be one which is relatively flaw-free in terms of a crack 
growth curve of flaw size versus lifetime, it will grow and it will fail some-
time after four 1 i fetimes. You say, "We 11, I have a safe structure for one 
lifetime". But any individual aircraft can have that larger initial flaw. 
When that happens, the structure can fail and the aircraft may fail well before 
one lifetime. That's very simply why that old approach to desi gn simply doesn't 
work. 
Now, I want to go quickly into the philosophy of what we're doing that's 
different. The first thing we've done is totally abandon the so-called safe 
life approach using the scatter factor of four to insure structural safety. 
It doesn't work; we've abandonded it; we're trying the damage tolerance approach 
now, and I'll describe that approach to you. In general, we're focusing on the 
requirements, and on the assumptions (rational assumptions as opposed to 
irrational), and identifying minimum requi red structural performance. We're 
not specifying the exact analysis methods that have to be used. We're sayi g, 
"Here's what the structure has to do, and these are acceptable assumptions 
and these are not. Now, how do you get from point A to point B. The method 
is up to you." There is a second point to be made. It says that damage 
tolerance and durability requirements will be implemented through fracture 
control programs so that we get the characteristics that we assume when we get 
the hardware. Now, this doesn't just refer to metals, it refers to composites, 
it refers to adhesive bonds. We've got to institute procedures that include 
inspection, process control, material selection, and a whole gamut of activities. 
All of these procedures must ensure that we get out of the final structure 
the characteristics that we had presumed. 
Now, just very quickly, I want to mention the specifications and standard 
regulations that the Air Force is using to implement the new philosophy and the 
requirements. The most important one is Mil Standard 1530, which you may have 
heard of. It's called the "Aircraft Structural Integrity Program." It 
describes the phi l osophy I mPntioned. It deals with design material selection. 
It also deals with fleet tracking and other kinds of activities, but specifically, 
it outlines the philosophy. 
Now, among other specifications that support the above activities is 
Mil-A-83444. It's a new one that talks about damage tolerance requirements 
for metals. There are no such specifications for composites nor for adhesive 
bond lines. But the philosophy in 1530 must be satisfied regardless of whether 
these specifications exist. The problem, really, for composites and adhesive 
bonds is, how do I satisfy the requirements in 1530 without the detailed how-to 
information in the specifications. Now, we handled that very well for metals, 
and the philosophy is equally true for adhesive bond joints and composites. We 
don't have the detailed how-to yet, and not having that how- to is gi ving 
Les Lackman fits these days. Right, Les? 
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DR. LACKMAN: You bet. 
DR. TUPPER: Very simply, this philosophy applies to safety of flight 
structure, and that means safety flight structure. If that structure fails, 
you got real problems. So, whether your structure is made out of metal or 
composite, whether it's adhesively bonded, fastened together or welded, the 
whole philosophy is applicable. It says simply that you must assume an initial 
flaw somewhere and that it can be detected. Although you don't have to satisfy 
any particular design approach, that is, fail safe structure or monolithic 
structure, you do have to make sure that the safe life approach is not used 
and that you can show the required safety of the structure. We feel that 
the philosophy will lead to a substantially improved maintenance picture at 
much lower cost because of the controls that we're placing and also because 
of better procedures for selection of materials and processing. We're getting 
a lot better NDI as a result of this approach as Phil Hodgetts, who is in t he 
audience, can testify. We're also getting lower stress levels and lower stress 
levels may be the most important of the lot, although as a metallurgist I 
guess I'm not allowed to say that. 
Now the specifications themselves include some key elements, and I'm going 
to hammer primarily today on the flaw size assumptions . Basically, we're 
saying, "Hey, you must assume that there's damage in that structure when it 
rolls out the door. " We further specify what size you must assume exists for 
metals. Now, we don't do that yet for adhesive bonds or composites, but the 
philosophy is still the same. You must recognize that structure is defective. 
Then, we're requiring minimum residual strength requirements in the presence 
of that initial defect. For some portion of the life time or perhaps the 
whole life time, you must have a minimum load carrying capability in the 
structure. 
The lengths of time which a structure can go unrepaired with damage are 
a function of the inspectability of the structure and the probabi lity of 
detection associated with the inspection procedure. We're worried about the 
time that it takes for the initial flaw to grow to a critical size and we spend 
a lot of time worrying about the presence of fasteners and what effect they 
have on flaw growth and flaw initiation. 
Now, in the simplest case that merely says that, with an initial flaw of 
some size, you must select a monolithic structure that's not inspectable. You 
must show analytically and by test that tha t flaw size will cause failure of 
the structure in two service lives. If it's inspectable, the interval is 
two times the inspection interval itself. You can see that we're really hammering 
now on the importance of this initial flaw. You can begin to see the importance 
of inspection because of the importance of the parameter, the initial flaw 
size. Of course, the larger that flaw size is, the much shorter your l ife 
becomes. So, we obviously have a very strong interest in quantitative NOT and 
improvements therein. 
Again, just to sort of summarize, our experience with initial flaws is 
that there is an extremely high probability that f l aws are there as a result of 
the manufacturing process. We cannot insure the safety of the structure by run-
ning a fatigue test and factor it by some amount. We have got o recognize 
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that the flaw exists and that it will grow, and we have to account for 
that. The flaws that we're talking about are not flaws primarily that are 
induced in service; they're manufacturing flaws . Again, I can't hammer on 
that hard enough. We are talking about initial flaws. We're specifying to 
an assumed minimum initial flaw size. That means that we're putting into the 
specifications the physical size of the flaw. The manufacturer and the designer 
of structure cannot assume that flaws smaller than that exist. He can, 
however, assume that flaws larger than that exist, but not smaller. For 
multiple load paths we're allowing smaller flaws because you do have, with the 
other requirements, the ability to sustain a one-member failure or some 
large crack growths and crack arrests. 
Furthermore, the flaw itself can't just be stuck in the structure willy-
nilly and assumed to exist anywhere. It's got to be assumed to exist in the 
most unfavorable location . ~gain, I guess that's a corollary on Murphy's law, 
but it happens to turn out that way. You must locate the flaw in regions 
of the structure which experience the largest stress. Further, in areas where 
you have a hole in the structure, such as a fastener hole, you must assume that 
the flaw exists in both members . The way that you're going to get the flaw 
in there to begin with is with a poorly drilled hole. If you drill a poor hole 
in two pieces, it ' s going to be a poor hole in both pieces. Therefore, these 
assumptions exist. 
We are also recognizing the presence of nondestructive inspection in the 
field, and we're specifying flaw sizes which result from those kinds of 
inspections. When the part is removed for inspection, we will, of course, 
allow for the same kind of initial flaw that you would have in the production 
inspection. You're doing the same kind of inspection. When the part is not 
removed-and we're allowing i n that case penetrant, mag particle and ultrasonics 
(notice the absence of x-ray)-you don't . The requirements on size are tougher. 
This kind of summarizes the whole business, and I'm not going to go through 
it with you at all other than to say that the requirements themselves are 
very comprehensive. We have been talking primarily about the specification 
Mil-A-83444. The philosophy that led to that is embodied in Mil-Standard 1530 . 
The requirements for adhesive bonded structure and for compos ite structure will 
come from the same top level standard, 1530, and will lead to requirements of 
the complexity and depth and approach as the one I just gave you for metals. 
Now, there are some test requirements. Let me go through this very 
quickly just to show you we are not doing this all analytically and it's not a 
figment of our imagination. We do requi e development tests on coupons and small 
components to verify the crack growth rate, to verify the assumptions that 
we've made in terms of how cracks grow phenomenologically. We have also 
full scale test requirements. Particularly, I want to talk damage tolerance 
testing, full scale tests. Full scale structure, if you assume that it's a 
multiple load path structure and that one member fails and that you still have 
the required residual strength, must be demonstrated in tests. Simil arly, 
you must demonstrate in that full scale test t he crack growth rate that you 
assumed exists. 
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Now, this is going to be something that we're really going to have to 
wrestle with in composite structure and in adhesive bonded structures. ln 
metals we can do accelerated testing, and we have a pretty good handle on 
what that is, at least for the room temperature type structure. We haven't 
got the moisture probl ems and the times i nvolved in that sort of thing. We 
don ' t have visco-elastic materials. Before we can do a full scale test on 
composites or adhesive bonded structures, I think we need a lot of work. 
We don't really know all the answers . We have t o push on with that, we have 
to get those answers and we're working on it very di li gently right now . 
In this talk, I've tried to give you a little bit of a feel for the 
philosophy that we're empl oying to get safe structures. A lot of it, I t hink, 
really doesn't pertain to the things that you're ·nterested in, but I thought 
it was important to get an idea of the depth and the philosophy that we're 
using. You can begin, then, to trans late that and understand why there i s 
so much emphas is suddenly on quantitative NDI. 
And with that I thank you. If there are any questions, I ' ll attempt 
to handle them. 
533 
DISCUSSION 
DR. CRAIG BIDDLE (Pratt/Whitney Aircraft): I'm aware of many of these 
Mil Standards that you're referring to which refer to aircraft structure. 
DR. TUPPER: That's right. 
DR. BIDDLE: Are you also going to be doing the same thing with the engine 
manufacturers? 
DR. TUPPER: Yes. 
DR. BIDDLE: Do you have any feeling for the time frame? 
DR. TUPPER: No. There's a lot of activitiy going on with that right now, 
as I'm sure you know. In terms of laying out a step-by-step procedure 
that says, "Well, by July of 1976 we're going to have these spec trees, 
no. We're not with that yet. We are, however, working with what the 
engine people call the low cycle fatigue problem which is really the 
same thing. 
DR. BIDDLE: A lot more complex because of the structures you're working 
with. 
DR. TUPPER: Pardon? 
DR. BIDDLE: It's a lot more complex because of the variety of materials that 
you're working with. 
DR. TUPPER: There are additional complexities. There are some areas where 
it's simpler. So, then, things tend to balance, but I think the same 
philosophy will apply --you'll shortly see it in the engine business, 
unless you guys are smart enough to head it off. 
DR. BIDDLE: We're trying. 
DR. STELLABOTTE (Naval Air Development Center): In your discussion on 
critical flaw sizes you mentioned that you eliminated x-ray. I can 
understand your reasons for that, but you said nothing about eddy 
current technologies. Was that just an oversight or has that also been 
eliminated? 
DR. TUPPER: Yes. That's an oversight, that would be an oversight. 
MR. STEVE HART (Naval Research Laboratory): What was the source of your 
information on crack sizes? 
DR. TUPPER: My information is a synopsis of the flaw sizes given in 
Mil-A-83444. 
MR. HART: It's in Mil-A-83444? 
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DR. TUPPER: They're in this classification. Mil-A-83444 is what specifies 
flaw sizes in various kinds of structures. 
DR. HAROLD FROST (Air Force Materials Laboratory): Ultrasonic fatigue testing 
is used on materials like metals, but there may be frequency effects where 
the ultrasonic test is done at a frequency that is much higher than the 
cycling method in practice. Do you have any comments to make on this as 
far as these policies are concerned? 
DR . TUPPER: Yes. 
DR. FROST: In determining failure characteristics? 
DR. TUPPER: Yes. The philosophy that we must follow is that there are some 
sort of discrete frequencies which aircraft structures see. I mean they're 
not discrete, but they're bands that are relatively narrow. We see 
sizeable loads in the six cycles per minute range and that sort of thing, 
none of which gets up into the ultrasonic range. The philosophy that we 
would have on a matter like that is that we must show the crack growth 
rate in the frequency rao1ge of interest, especially where there are 
environmental effects involved with it. If we can show that the growth 
rate that we're attempting to measure is insensitive to frequency, then 
the faster the better, because it's cheaper. That would be our approach 
to it. 
DR. GERRY GARDNER (Southwest Research Institute): What state of development 
are the documents for composites and adhesives in at this point? 
DR. TUPPER: Very formulative. They're not in any state at all, really. There 
is in existence a o·equirement for structural integrity for compos~tes 
on the F-16 program. That was something that was put together as an 
attempt to embody this philosophy. It is not a general document, it is 
one that is for that airplane only. I think what we're going to try and 
do is learn from an attempt to apply this philosophy and see where the 
gaps are. I think Les can probably expand on that more than I can. 
DR. LES LACKMAN: Yes, I guess I could a little bit. In terms of the B~l 
composite application program in an attempt to satisfy Mil-Standard-A-83444 
for a strength critical design, the requirement states that a structure, 
as delivered into service with flaws no greater than a certain size, 
must show ability after two life times to carry a load P~x· Pxx is the 
maximum load the structure would see in 20 life times. In addition 
to that you also have a safety of flight requirement that you must proof 
load the structure to a level to insure that no part would fail prior to 
one life time. In other words, you have to be able to carry Pxx into one 
life time. Those are for strength critical designs. If you can show you 
have an overstrength design in the sense there is no wear out after the 
one life time, then proof testing is no longer required. So, we are looking 
at it. 
Unfortunately, on the composite side we're not as sophisticated yet as the 
metal people in terms of analytical tools, determination of critical 
flaw sizes, the function of structure, and the function of materials. 
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 We're kind of groping. It's more of an empirical approach at this 
time. Very little analytical activities have yet been done to support 
development of the criteria for meeting these new specs. 
OR. TUPPER: Yes. There is just one hell of a lot of work that has to be done 
in both composites and adhesives. 
OR . LACKMAN: Nate, I'm going to ask you a question . 
DR. TUPPER: I don't think I have to answer ·that. 
OR. LACKMAN: As you pointed out, there ' s a significant penalty in terms of 
life requirements for size and structure if it ' s non-inspectable versus 
if it's an inspectable structure. Basically, in the composite structures, 
we have been treating these as non-inspectable type structures, the 
reason being is that we have delaminations midway through a thickness. 
I guess I'm kind of giving jab out here to this audience in that we don't 
have low cost inspection techniques that will afford us the opportunity 
to inspect the structure rather readily. I wdnted to know, do you have 
any feel what this costs in terms of weight or cost when you go to a non-
inspectable structure versus inspectable structure in terms of the more 
severe design requirements? 
DR. TUPPER: Les, I think that that's much too design specific. I can't give 
you an answer to that. There's an obvious penalty. How much it is, 
is going to depend on your specific design, the stresses, the materials 
in there, the environments and all that sort of thing. There's a penalty- · 
there's no question about it- but 1 just can't give you a general answer 
to it . 
COL. RON NOKES (Kelly Air Force Base): Nate, the first day here we saw a lot 
of presentations on the efforts these people are trying to make to 
quantify spheroids and ellipsoids buried in the interior of a structure. 
Yet the examples of defects that you showed on your slides are all surface 
oriented, they ' re all open to the surface. Is the research that's going 
on now not really oriented toward the Mil-Spec, or--
DR. TUPPER: No , that's not true. I think that the problem is in the impression 
I gave. The defects can exist anywhere. In fact, we've done a lot of 
work on internal defects . The point is that circular or ellipsoidal 
defects may grow and become cracks. The requirement itself does handle 
and does require the assumption that the defect is in various locations 
including internal defects. So, no, I think the research is well aimed. 
DR. LACKMAN: Okay. Nate, thank you very much. 
DR. TUPPER: Thank you . 
536 
